

Exhibit 2.

Trans-Alaska Pipeline System Overcharges

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**Trans-Alaska Pipeline System Overcharges,
1977-1996 (RCA 2002 Decision and Finding)**

[Exhibit 2 Data Sheet]

RCA, Order No. 151 (Docket P-97-4), Nov. 27, 2002

[Exhibit 2 Source, Sheet 1]

RCA, Order No. 151 (Docket P-97-4), Nov. 27, 2002

[Exhibit 2 Source, Sheet 2]

Trans-Alaska Pipeline System Overcharges, 1977-1996 (RCA 2002 Decision and Finding)

Exhibit 2 Data Sheet *

1. TAPS Overcharges, 1977-1996	\$13,500,000,000.00 (1)
2. Barrels Shipped, 1977-1996 (estimated)	11,479,980,000 (2)
3. Carrier Overcharge per barrel, 1997- 1996 (1997 \$)	\$1.18 (3)
4. CPI-U Indexed Inflation Factor (1997 – 2012)	1.386 (4)
5. TAPS Overcharge per barrel, 1977 – 1996 (2012 \$)	\$1.63 (5)

6. Estimated Reduced Payments to State, 1977 - 1996 (2012 \$)	Approx. \$5.6 billion (6)*
7. Est. Non-TAPS Owner Overpayments (1977 - 1996 (2012 \$)	Approx. \$1.2 billion (7)*

Sources

(1) Regulatory Commission of Alaska, *Order Rejecting 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 Filed TAPS Rates: Setting Just and Reasonable Rates; Required Refunds and Filings; And Outlining Phase II Issues* (Docket P-97-4, Order No. 151), Nov. 27, 2002, p. 131.

(2) Estimated from Alaska Department of Revenue, *Fall 2002 Revenue Sources Book*, Appendix E (p. 130).

(3) = (Line 1 / Line 2)

(4) Calculated from CPI-U (U.S. Dept. of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, accessed Oct. 20, 2011; updated with U.S. Energy Information Administration data)

(5) = (Line 3 * Line 4)

(6) = (Line 2 * Line 5) * 0.3

(7) = (Line 2 * Line 5) * 0.1 * 0.65

Notes

Lines (1) through (5): the \$13.5 billion in 1997 dollars represents TAPS overpayments over a 20-year period in real or inflation-adjusted dollars, calculations 1 through 5 represent an estimate of these amounts in nominal (2013) dollars.

* Line (6). This line represents the total reduced payments to the state resulting from the TAPS tariff overcharges from 1977 through 1996 (based on the assumption that over this 20-year period the state collected approximately 30% of net petroleum revenue in royalty and taxes). Since three TAPS shipper-owners accounted for approximately 90% of the North Slope production shipped through TAPS, over this 20-year period they retained approximately 90% of the overcharge total. (Original estimate of \$5.3 billion corrected and rounded to correct typographical error and rounded to reflect approximation. – July 7, 2013)

* Line (7). This line represents the portion of TAPS overcharges paid out-of-pocket by independent TAPS shippers to the TAPS owners between 1977 and 1996, with payments reduced by an assumed 35% federal income tax rate on profits, as determined in the November 2002 TAPS tariff decision. (In this case, the RCA was not collecting refunds for the 1977-1996 period. Rather, the RCA was quantifying past tariffs to estimate the rate base for future TAPS tariffs and post-1996 refunds permitted by the statute of limitations. Put otherwise: The TAPS owners did not refund the overcharges collected from shippers between 1977 and 1996. (Original estimate rounded to reflect approximation. – July 7, 2013)

1 B. Comparing From the Beginning of Pipeline Operation, the Annual Past
2 Revenue Requirements of a DOC Methodology With the Annual Past Revenue
3 Requirements of TSM, Demonstrates That the Year-end 1996 Rate Base of \$669
4 Million Is Reasonable

5 We now compare the past annual DOC revenue requirements shown at
6 Exhibit 33 with the past annual TSM revenue requirements. Exhibit 7, Schedule 2
7 reveals that TSM has, on a cumulative basis,⁵⁴⁷ provided the Carriers with an
8 opportunity to recover \$9.9 billion more than their costs as determined by the DOC
9 revenue requirements.⁵⁴⁸ In 1997 dollars, the net present value⁵⁴⁹ of the cumulative
10 stream of revenue requirement differences is \$13.5 billion, far in excess of the \$669
11 million year-end 1996 DOC rate base.

12 Because the revenue requirements determined under TSM have been
13 higher than costs as determined under a DOC methodology applied consistently from
14 the beginning of pipeline operations, we find that the Carriers have had ample
15 opportunity to recover costs and no taking of Carrier property occurs if we adopt a \$669
16

17 ⁵⁴⁷Our finding regarding the appropriateness of TSM depreciation and the year-
18 end 1996 rate base is properly tested with reference to the Carriers' *cumulative*
19 historical opportunity to recover their full costs of service. In *Re Amerada Hess Pipeline*
20 *Corporation*, Order P-97-4(79), April 10, 2000, we directed the Carriers to show that
21 1997-2000 rates reflect costs. We found that evidence that rates are just and
22 reasonable over the life of the line is not sufficient to prove that the rates for specific
23 years are just and reasonable. *Id.*, at 11. The Carriers' "life of the line" argument
24 requires, among other things, a projection of costs of service into the future. Moreover,
25 it fails to address whether 1997-2000 costs are reflected in 1997-2000 filed rates. We
26 evaluate *historical* costs; we do so to determine whether 1997-2000 rates reflect the
costs of providing service for the years in question.

⁵⁴⁸Exhibit 7, Schedule 2, Line 1.

⁵⁴⁹Exhibit 7, Schedule 2, Line 2. The net present value calculation uses interest
rates equal to the Commission's overall weighted rate of return in each year. See
Exhibit 7, Schedule 1, Line 6. We note that the present value comparative revenue
requirement analysis indexes 1997 dollars, because those are the dollars with which the
remaining rate base is measured.

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